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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BRIGIWI CITY SAND & GRAVEL,
a corporation, GUY HIGLEY and
KNOWLTOI~ BR0\11',
Plaintiff-Appellants,
vs.
MACH II~ERY CENTER, INC., VERA M.
JENSEr~, and THE JENSEN TRUST,
STERLING M. JENSEN, GWEN J. EMMETT
JONES and IRENE J. SANFORD,
Trustees ,

Case No.

16325

Defendant-Respondents,
vs.
R. J. HARRIS, HACH I NERY AIW
LEASING COMPANY and R. J. HARRIS,
Third Party Defendants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit brought by Brigham City Sand and Gravel, et al.,
agai11st Defendant-Respondents, t\achinery Center,

Inc.,

for return of personal

property and against DefenJants, Vera t\. Jensen, and the Jensen Trust,
SterliPg 11. Jensen, Gv1en J. Emmett Jones and Irene J. Sanford, Trustees,
for the ,-etur•

Jf pe,-sonal property, and in the alternative, for damages

for the conv<Crsiun uf the per-sonal property.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon motion by counsel for Machinery Center,

Inc., the

Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, Utah, dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff-Appellants'
Camp I a i nt.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek affirmance of the Lower Court's Order of
Dismissal on the ground that no error was committed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellants' Statement of Facts fails to emphasize certain
facts important to disposition of this matter.

Defendant-Respondents,

Machinery Center, Inc. (hereinafter Machinery Center) do not dispute the
facts as stated, but present the following statements for purposes of
clarification.
Nachi nery Center purchased certain property from Third-Party Defendants,
R.J. Harris Machinery and Leasing Company and R.J. Harris (hereinafter
R. J. Harris) and received for said equipment a Bill of Sale in January, 1975.
R. J. Harris had previously purchased the machinery from Vera M. Jensen and
the Jensen Trust, Sterling f1. Jensen, Gwen J. Emmett Jones and I rene J. Sa11fnr•J.
Trustees (h."einafter Jensen, et al.),

in October,

1974. Jensens. cr al., dilege

that the equipment had been abandoned by PlaintifF-Appel I ants, Brigham City
Sand and Gravel, (hereinafter Plaintiff).

The abandonment had occurred upon

real property owned by the Trust.
In 1977, Plaintiff brought suit against Machinery Center seeking 011iy rni
return of the personal property.

f1achinery Center, by way of Thi .-cl Pdrty Lor>~p'
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brought suit against its vendor, R. J. Harris, seeking damages for breach
of warranty of title should Plaintiff be successful

in its suit.

Plaintiff

then amended its Complaint to bring suit against Jensens, et al., seeking
return of the personal property or, in the alternative, damages in the sum of
$12,000.00.

In response, Jensens filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff

alleging trespass.

At this juncture, R. J. Harris filed a Cross-Claim

against Jensens, et al., praying for indemnification on any judgment recovered
by Machinery Center.
Prior to trial, Plaintiff executed a compromise settlement agreement,
1·1hereby Jensens paid Plaintiffs $2,500,00 in settlement of all claims and
under which Plaintiff agreed to indemnify Jensens for any liability which
Jensens may incur as a result of R. J. Harris' Cross-Claim.
Immediately prior to trial, ~1achinery Center moved the Trial Court
for an Order of Dismissal upon the grounds that in settling the matter
with Jensens, et al., Plaintiff had elected its remedy to pursue that of
recovery of the va I ue of the property and should therefore be barred from
seeking return of the property.

Since Plaintiff had sued Defendant,

11achinery Center, for the return of the property, and not for damages for
conversion, the Trial Judge found that plaintiff had elected one of two
inconsisLent remedies and that the remedy elected had been satisfied and
therefore, dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.
ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF,
IN ELECTI~G AH INCONSISTENT REMEDY AND OBTAINING SATISFACTION
THEREON, WAS BARRED FROM PURSUI~G AN ALTERNATIVE INCONSISTENT
REMEDY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Trial Court, in its Judgment, states:
.(in) accepting damages in the amount of $2,500.00
from defendants, Jensen, et al., plaintiffs have elected a
remedy of damages and have compromised and settled the said
claim and are thereby precluded from pursuing the defendant,
Machinery Center, Inc,, for the return of said property,
which would result in double recovery • . •
Judgment, page 2.

So stating, the Court correctly applied the applicable

law to the facts of this case.

Plaintiffs brought suit against Machinery

Center for return of specific property, a distinct common law remedy, and
then subsequently brought suit against the Jensens, et al., for damages
based on the theory of conversion and, in the alternative, for the return of
the specific property (inconsistent remedies).

They have elected one of the

inconsistent remedies and, through settlement, have obtained satisfaction with
respect to the elected remedy.
Machinery Center does not contend that the Utah Rules of Civi 1
Procedure do notal !ow pleading of inconsistent remedies in the alternative.
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civi I Procedure, clearly states that this practice is
allowed.

However, respondent does contend that Rule 8 has not abo! ished

the Doctrine of Election of Remedies in the State of Utah.
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161,
253 P. 196 (1927), the Suj.lreme Court of Utah stated the rationale and
application of Lhe doctrine of election of remedies.

The Court explained:

The doctrine of an election rests upon the principle
LhaL one may not tAke contrary positions, dnd where he
has a right to choose one of two modes of redress, and
the t1~o are so inconsistent that the assertion of one
involves a negation or repudiation of the other, the
deliberate and settled choice of the one, with knowledge
or means of knowledge of such facts as would authorize
a resort to each, wi I 1 preclude him thereafter from
going back and electing again.
253 P. at 200,

The Court further stated:
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The true rule seems to be (I) that there must be,
in fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which
the party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and
(3) he must by actually bringing an action or by some
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, indicate
his choice between these inconsistent remedies.

253 P. at 199.
The Court of Civi I Appeals of Texas, in the case of National
Surety Co. et al. v. Odie, et al., 40 SW 2d 876, (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1931)
dealt with the problem of applying the doctrine of election of remedies
to a case involving facts similar to the case now before the Court.
In this decision, Odie had brought suit in a Justice Court to recover a specific
bale of cotton or, in the alternative, to recover its value.

Under a

Writ of Sequestration, the bale was seized by the constable.

Odie

recovered judgment for the cotton bale or, in the alternative, its value.
Judgment directed the constable to deliver the bale to Odie,

Odie then

brought suit in County Court on a conversion theory and recovered a money
judgment.

The Appeals Court allowed Odie to recover costs not recovered

in the Justice Court, but refused to allow recovery for the bale's value.
In its decision, the Court explained:
Plaint iff had at his election two remedies for redress
of the injury r~sul ting from the theft of the bale of cotton
in controversy in this c~se. One of such remedies was to
sue for the recovery of the specific property. The other
was to treat the possession thereof by defendants, and their
refusal to surrender thce same on demand, as a conversion,
dnd sue for the value thereof. Such remedies were inconsistent, and the assert ion of one was necessarily a waiver
uf the other, exc~pt in the alternative that the remedy first
sought had proved unavailable. A suit for specific property
involves a pprsist~.1t and continuing claim by the plaintiff
_cJ_f___t_iJJ_c:__!_u the prop...:o:..t..Lsued for and invokes the aid of the

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court to effect its restoration. A suit for· conversion
treats the unlawful acts of appropriation by the defendant as having divested the plaintiff of his title and
invokes the aid of the court to secure compensation
therefor
an award of its value as damages in I ieu
thereof.
Emphasis added)

bT

40 SW 2d at 877.

The Court found that Odie had elcected his remedies

''!c'"

1

J,

constable had seized the bale on Odie's behalf under the ~lrit and thal c''''-'
Odie technically had obtained the return of the bale and therefore had uh

'""'

satisfaction of the Justice Court Judgment, he was barred from bringing rile
new suit for conversion.
In this matter, Plaintiff-Appellants have brought suit against
Machinery Center for the return of the specific property in question.
As stated in

Odie,~

this suit involves a claim that title to the

property has remaineu in the plaintiff.

Plaintiff then amended its Cornplcrrr,,

to bring suit against the Jensens, et al., to return the specific equipmcrlt
or, in the alter~atr;c, fCJr oamages for conversion.

Conversion treats

the acts of defen•:ur'lo "s divesting plaintiff of title and seeks conJpcw__ ,,_,,,
for the property's value.

In the acceptance of money damages, pursuant to

the compromise agreement with Jensens, Plaintiff has clearly taken action
constiLuling an election bet\'Jeen two inconsistent remedies, and has obluifled
satisi'action of the elected remedy.

As stated in Cook, supra, Plain1 iff hds

indicated his choice betc-1een inconsistent remedies by takin9 the decio<
of settling for damages 1vi thout obtaining a return of the property frcn
Jensens, e t a 1.
The compromise and settlement of a suit constitutes such an
election as wi II preclude plaintiff from the•eafter prosecu! i11';
an action upon d theory inconsistent with that on which the
former action v1as maintained.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'''·'

28 C.J.S. Election of Remedies, Section II.

Therefore, in making this

election, Plaintiff is thereafter barred from seeking the inconsistent
remedy of return of the property from t1achinery Center.
Plaintiffs are correct in quoting Farmers and Merchants Bank v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Ut. 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1049 (1955) for
the applicable law to be applied under the doctrine of election of remedies.
However, Plaintiffs are mistaken as to Universal C.t.T.'s application to
the facts herein,

As. pointed out

in~~'

the remedies of return of

specific property and of damages for conversion are clearly inconsistent
remedies due to their reliance upon inconsistent facts.

To recover on the

theory of return of property, Plaintiffs. must show that title remained in
Plaintiffs.

To recover on a conversion theory, Plaintiffs must show

that title has been divested from Plaintiffs by Defendants' actions.

Since

Plaintiffs have elected by a settlement with Jensens., et al. to settle on
the basis of the conversion theory, Plaintiffs. cannot now allege inconsistent
facts necessary to support a c I aim for return of the property against
~chinery

Center, since the settlement of the elected remedy operates as

~judicata

with respect to the facts supporting the elected remedy of

damages for conversion.
Plaintiffs state that the settlement has been engineered in such
rll'lay that double recovery wi II not occur.
J';

quidance for the Trial Court.

Plaintiff sets out three scenarios

However, Plaintiff has failed to realize

:hat the causes of action betwecen the various parties are not so interrelated
that the findings on the different matters wi II fall into I ine under a
'co11i11u theory",

Any attempt to avoid the bar of election of remedies by

'he Pldi11tiff should
•lvr

·lot<: by

hd'Jc

beer, r~<adc

before settlement and not at this

1 he dcvelclP"'""t of scenarios.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PO I NT I I
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES TO
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS.
The suit before the Court was precipitated by the neg I igent act i""'
of the Plaintiff, Brigham City Sand and Gravel.

According to Jensens, el al
equi 1 ""~r,:

mvners of the real property upon which the equipment was located, the
had been abandoned and unused from

19GB until 1:174, a pel-iod of six years.

Jensens, et al. also understood that the City of Brigham was insisting th.,l
steps be taken to remove the equipment which constituted a hazard to chi ldt.'
who played in the area. (R.30)
was last operated in

1970.

(R.

Plaintiff, Higley, admits that the propcn

79)

1

His Answers to the Interrogatories ·11Sc>

show that although he I ived in f·1antua, Utah, approximately five rni les fro111 'he
location of the equipment, Higley did not discover that the property had
removed until Sprin·J, :~:75.
in October,

(R, 01)

b~en

R. J. Harris had purchased the equil''"'"'t

1974, more than six months prior to the date of Higley's Jiscovc·t,.

By the time Plaintiff had discovered the sale to harris. the eq~tic>ntent

(R. 54)

had been sold to the Defendant, 11achinery Center.

(R. 24)

Machine,-y c~nlt't

had purchased the equipment after checking with the Secretary of Stale to
determine if there were security interest fi I ings against the equirment "n.J
r~eceived

d

lli II of Sale for the equipment.

t1achinery Center

,~ecognizes

(R.

24)

th<Jt under certdin

ci,-cumstunces~,

of the Doctrine of Elect io11 of Remedies can produce harsh results,
consequently, courts are sensitive
the doctrine.

LO

equitable principle' in

.. 1 ·:

urld

r I',·

a~pl'i;"'~

However, the facts shown above clearly i11Jicate tlt<~l rh,~

in this matter I ie vlith t1achinery Center.

-3-
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Clearly, the equitable maxim that "equity aids one who has been vigilant"
should apply to the facts of this case for the benefit of the Defendant,
If Plaintiffs had taken the steps necessary to properly

11ach i nery Center.

notify the parties, especially Jensens, et al., that the property was not
abandoned, either in writing or through actions, rather than remaining silent
for a period of five or six years, the conversion by Jensens, et al., would
not have occurred.

1·\oreover, if Plaintiffs had been vigilant in their care

and maintenance of the property, they could have discovered the fact of
Jensens, et al., sale of the property soon after its occurrence, and
cherefore, could have prevented the subsequent sale to Machinery Center,
an innocent party and bona fide purchaser without notice.
The equities ti It in Machinery Center's favor when the maxim
"equity wi II help only those who help themselves" is applied.

Under the

circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs had within their control, all of the
avenues to protect their property from the conversion that occurred.

Since

Plaintiffs' omission precipitated the circumstances resulting in Pia inti ffs'
claim for damages, one must conclude that the equities favor Machinery Center
since it purchased without notice, for value, from a dealer in the regular
oourse uf business, after making prudent inquiries regarding the existence
If this maxim is follmveJ,

the Court should hesi :dte to

'''" :,ction to 1·cscue Plaintiffs from the circumstances which have resulterl
frun·1 !

he it

o~Jn

dC

t ions.

If th,, Cou,·t concludes that equitable considerations are 3pplicable,

-9-
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the Court should bear in mind that Plaintiffs have received $2,500 from
Jensens, et al., in settlemeni.
Election of Remedies wi 11

~I

To refuse to apply the Doctrine of

low Plaintiffs to recover both damages and the

property, a circumstance which the Doctrine of Election of Remedies was
developed to avoid.

Indeed, this case is one for the application of the

Doctrine of the Election of Remedies.

Plaintiffs' failure to act prudently

has created a situation under which Machinery Center, an innocent purchaser,
would suffer damage.

Plaintiffs' voluntary election of an inconsistent remedy,

damages, and the settlement thereof, should bar further claim to the property.

"''

The Court should, therefore, refuse to extricate Plaintiff from a situation
caused by Plaintiffs' own actions.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court was correct in holding that Plaintiff had made an
elect ion of remedies an,J was thereby barred from pursuing an alternative
inconsistent remedy against Respondents.

In compromising and settling the

case on a conversion-damages theory, Plaintiff has clearly taken steps
showing an election between the conversion-damages theory and the alternative,
but inconsistent, return of specific property theory.

Case law c ]early supporcs

the Trial Judge's finding that due to Plaintiffs' election, and satisfaction.
Pl.::i"t.iffs are barred from §Peking return of th:e property.
eqt~ities

Furlhtel', tlw

clearly preponderate in favor of an application of the Doctrine

of []ection of Rert1edies and the Judgment of the Lower Courl should be
affirmed.
-10-
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Res.e__ectfully submitted this
.!:?
day of June, 1979.

7·

Roy G. Haslam
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Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Machinery Center, Inc,
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